Abstract-The secrecy capacity region for the -receiver degraded broadcast channel (BC) is given for confidential messages sent to the receivers and to be kept secret from an external wiretapper. Superposition coding and Wyner's random code partitioning are used to show the achievable rate tuples. Error probability analysis and equivocation calculation are also provided. In the converse proof, a new definition for the auxiliary random variables is used, which is different from either the case of the two-receiver BC without common message or the -receiver BC with common message, both with an external wiretapper, or the -receiver BC without a wiretapper.
I. INTRODUCTION
A N important requirement for wireless systems today is the characterization of transmission rates that allow for both secure and reliable communication for the physical layer. A suitable model for the wireless broadcast and communications medium is the broadcast channel (BC) with confidential messages [1] , which is a generalization of the wiretap channel by Wyner [2] . The secrecy level is determined by using the equivocation rate, which is the entropy rate of the confidential message conditioned on the channel output at the wiretapper. The secrecy capacity region is the set of transmission rates where the legitimate receiver decodes its confidential message while keeping the message secret from the wiretapper.
In more recent studies on the BC with confidential messages, Liu et al. [3] investigated the scenario where there are two receivers and private messages are sent to each one and kept secret from the unintended receiver; Xu et al. [4] studied the case in [3] but with a common message to both receivers; Bagherikaram et al. [5] addressed the scenario where there are two receivers and one wiretapper, with confidential messages sent to the receivers. For the class of degraded BCs [9] , Ekrem and Ulukus [7] examined the -receiver degraded BC and one wiretapper with confidential messages as well as a common message sent to the receivers.
In this paper, we provide an alternative proof (to [7] ) for the secrecy capacity of the degraded -receiver BC with confidential messages sent to each receiver in the presence of a wiretapper. Our results are a generalization of our work for three receivers in [6] and earlier results for two receivers in [5] . There are some appreciable differences between our approach and that in [7] . In particular, equivocation calculation and proof of the converse in [7] are accomplished from the perspective of the channel sum rate. In contrast, we provide the error probability analysis and the equivocation calculation with respect to the th receiver's achievable rate. In our proof of the converse, which we have shown for the th receiver, we note that our choice of auxiliary random variables is different from that of [5] and [7] . Due to the presence of the wiretapper, it is also different from the choice in [8] where the capacity region for the degraded -receiver BC using superposition coding without confidential messages is studied.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the general -receiver degraded BC with confidential messages. In Section III, we state our main result for the secrecy capacity for the degraded -receiver BC with wiretapper and show the proof of achievability and equivocation calculation in Sections III-A and III-B, respectively. In Section IV, we show the converse proof. Finally, we give conclusions in Section V.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
In this paper, we use the uppercase letter to denote a random variable (e.g., ) and the lowercase letter for its realization (e.g., ). The alphabet set of is denoted by so that . We can also have a sequence of random variables, denoted by with its realization if for . Furthermore, we define the subsequences of as and . The discrete memoryless -receiver BC with an external wiretapper consists of a finite input alphabet and finite output alphabets and has conditional distribution . Thus, the discrete memoryless BC with receivers and a wiretapper has an input random sequence , output random sequences, , at the intended 0018-9448/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE receivers, and an output random sequence at the wiretapper . Likewise, we have and . The conditional distribution for uses of the channel is (1) The transmitter has to send independent messages to the receivers in perfect secrecy. This is done using a -code for the BC, which consists of the stochastic encoder (2) and the decoders (3) The probability of error is defined as the probability that the decoded messages are not equal to the transmitted messages, i.e., (4) Perfect secrecy requires that the mutual information of the transmitted messages and the wiretapper goes to zero. Let us illustrate this for message and receiver 1. The perfect secrecy requirement is (5) where denotes mutual information and is entropy. Now, let the information rate for the first receiver be and the equivocation rate be . Then, we need (6) Further to this, we define and , and the following equivocation rates for the -receiver degraded BC:
III. SECRECY CAPACITY REGION
The secret rate tuple is achievable if for any arbitrarily small , ,
, and , there exist -codes for which and (8) Equation (8) gives the security conditions for the -receiver BC with a wiretapper under perfect secrecy requirements in (6).
Theorem 1:
The secrecy capacity region for the -receiver degraded BC with an external wiretapper is the closure of all rate tuples satisfying
where are auxiliary random variables and will be defined in Section III-A (Random codebook generation).
Proof: The proof of achievability and equivocation calculation are given later in this section. The proof of converse is given separately in Section IV.
If we use superposition coding with code partitioning to achieve the rates in Theorem 1, then the secrecy capacity region may be interpreted as the capacity region for the -receiver BC using superposition coding without the wiretapper, with the rates at each receiver each reduced due to the presence of the wiretapper. However, we shall see that the choice of auxiliary random variables in the proof of converse for the -receiver BC will be different from that of [8] , which is without the secrecy conditions. This is also in contrast to the two-receiver BC with wiretapper in [5] , where the same definition for the auxiliary random variables in the converse proof can be used for the scenarios with and without the secrecy conditions.
A. Proof of Achievability
In this paper, we employ superposition coding and Wyner's random code partitioning to show the achievable rate tuples . For brevity, we use to denote the channel from to , similarly for the channels from to outputs and , by and , respectively.
The coding strategy is depicted in Fig. 1 For each of the above cases, if there is none or more than one possible decoded message, then an error will be declared. Note that is unimportant for the decoding of at the th receiver. 4) Obtaining the sizes of subcodes : Here, we follow the approach of Wyner [2] and show how to obtain in the encoding of , for . Following the same routine, and can be obtained easily, and thus, these calculations will be omitted.
To start with, suppose that we have the messages, . We now define
The codeword is a channel code for and simultaneously and is comprised of subcodes . is an uniformly randomly chosen member of . Therefore
The codeword is a channel code for with prior distribution on codewords given by (16). Each of is a channel code for the wiretap channel with codewords and uniform prior distribution on the codewords. Let be the error probability for with an optimal decoder, when is chosen as the index for the codeword from . Then, is the average error probability for with an optimal decoder, averaged over the probability that is sent given the previous messages were . As Cover and Thomas in [10] , and provide the analysis for the th receiver. Assume without loss of generality that is sent and is sent for the subcodes . At the th receiver, define the following events (and their complements denoted by the superscript ):
Then, by the union of events bound, we have (25) at the bottom of the page, where there are terms in each of the first and second lines of the inequality (25); the last term in the first line of (25) refers to the probability that the complement of the event that the -length vector of all ones occurred; and the last term in the second line of (25) refers to the probability that the event that the -length vector occurred. For the first two terms of (25), we have (26) Denoting the event as , the th term can be written as (27) at the bottom of the page. As a result (28) for sufficiently large and Following the same approach, for the first receiver, we can get the above inequalities in (31), as well as (32) Therefore, for all the receivers, given the previous definitions for in (23), it can be seen that the probability of error at each receiver satisfies for and for any rate tuple satisfying the conditions in Theorem 1. Thus, the direct part of Theorem 1 is proved.
(25) (27)
B. Equivocation Calculation
We show the calculation for the th receiver for , for , and the sum rates and . We shall make use of the relation
For the th receiver, , we have (34) at the bottom of the page, where (a) and (b) have the first two terms by (33) and (c) has the first term by (33) and the second term by the fact that . We now bound each of the terms in the last line of (34 (41) where . Hence, the security condition in (8) is satisfied for the th receiver. For the first receiver, we condition on in the second line of the chain of inequalities above, while for the th receiver, we can omit the second line of the chain of inequalities in (34) above, while subsequently not performing additional conditioning in (34). The equivocation rates for the first receiver and the th receiver will have the same form as (41) above with and . We next show the equivocation rates for adjacent receivers , for . We also assume that, for the equivocation rate for any two adjacent receivers , for to be achievable, the th receiver must (34) have knowledge of . Then, we have (42) at the bottom of the page, where (a), (b), and (d) have the first two terms by (33), and (c) has the first term by (33) and the second term by . We now bound each of the terms in the last line of (42). For the first term, given , has possible values with equal probability. For the second term, given , has possible values with equal probability. Therefore, we have (43) For the third term, it can be shown that (44) For the last term, we have (45) where the first equality is because of the fact that and are independent, and the last line is by conditioning reducing entropy. From the last line of (45), by Fano's inequality, we have (46) where for sufficiently large. We need to show that is small for sufficiently large so that (46) holds, as we already have shown that is small for sufficiently large. We consider the situation where the wiretapper attempts to decode given by joint typicality. Then, following the same procedure to calculate in (40) above, we have 
where , and so security condition (8) is shown. We note that to show equivocation rates for the pair , 2, this can be done by following the proof above, but replacing by . The security condition has been shown for pairs of adjacent receivers. For any subset of receivers, we note that since are independent of each other, we have the relation that . Then, we can repeat the proof for each of , and by taking the sum, we can see that the sum rate of any subset of the receivers meets the perfect secrecy requirement (8) .
Next, we show the proof for the equivocation sum rate . We have (50) where (a), (b), and (d) have the first two terms by (33), and (c) has the first term by (33) and the second term by the fact that . We now bound each of the terms in the last line of (50). For the first term, has possible values with equal probability. For the second to the th terms, given the preceding codewords , has possible values with equal probability. For the th term, given all the preceding codewords, has possible values with equal probability. As such, we have (51a) (51b) . . .
(51c)
For the second last term, it can be shown that (52) For the last term, we have (53) where the first equality is because of the fact that successively, we have and are independent, and are independent, and so on, and the last line is by conditioning reducing entropy. Now by applying Fano's inequality to each term in the last line of (53) , where for sufficiently large by considering the wiretapper decoding given the respective associated messages and the preceding codewords. This is done using the same method of joint typicality and the choice of rates for , as shown in the above for the equivocation rates for and . Thus (55) Then, by substituting (51a)-(51c), (52), and (55) into the last line of (50), we have, given the definitions for the rate tuple in (23),
where and the security conditions in (8) are satisfied. As a result, we have shown that the equivocation rates in (8) are achievable, and hence the secret rate tuple .
IV. PROOF OF CONVERSE
Here, we show the converse proof to Theorem 1. Consider a code with error probability with the code construction so that we have the condition . Then, the probability distribution on is given by (57)
In the following, we give the proof for the rate at the th receiver. We shall also show later that the proof for the th receiver can be easily obtained from this, while the proof for the first receiver requires a few additional steps. 
We note that our choice of auxiliary random variables is different from Bagherikaram et al., which deals with the two-receiver degraded BC with an external wiretapper [5] , and from [7] , which studies the -receiver degraded BC with a common message and an external wiretapper. The choice is also different, due to the presence of the wiretapper, from that of Borade et al.
in [8] which deals with the -receiver degraded BC without secrecy conditions. Thus, we have
where (a) is due to the condition (68), and (b) is due to since we have . As a result, we have
To show the converse for , we follow the same steps as above, but additionally, we use (65) with to arrive at the equivalent chain of equalities (69) The proof for is easily obtained using the above approach, only without conditioning on in the second line of (58). This results in (73) Now, we introduce the random variable , which is uniformly distributed among the integers and is independent of all other random variables. Define the following auxiliary random variables (74a) (74b) . . . and the converse to Theorem 1 is proved.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented an alternative proof for the secrecy capacity region for the degraded -receiver BC with private messages in the presence of a wiretapper which generalizes previous work which dealt with two-receiver BCs. In the direct proof, we have used superposition coding and Wyner's random code partitioning to show the achievable rate tuples. We have provided error probability analysis and equivocation calculation for the general th receiver. In the converse proof, we have used a new definition for the auxiliary random variables which is different from either the two-receiver BC with a wiretapper, or the more recently studied -receiver BC with common message and wiretapper, or the -receiver BC without wiretapper cases.
